Phänomenologische Forschungen 2021-2

Abstracts
De Santis, Daniele, Manca, Danilo: Introduction. The Given: Historical and Hermeneutical Category or Laziness and Perversion of Reason?

Filieri, Luigi: Sellars and Kant on Givenness and Intuition.
In this paper, I argue that Sellars’s conceptualist reading of Kant, though less radical than more contemporary approaches (e. g., Brandom, McDowell), relies on a controversial account of the relations between the givenness of intuitions, the productive imagination and the power of judgment. I will discuss: 1) how Sellars reconsidered Kant’s account of intuition; and 2) the kind of conceptualism he argues for. I will raise two main claims. First, Sellars’s conceptualist reading of intuition overlooks the role of space and time as givenness conditions. Second, Sellars’s account of the productive imagination disregards the complementary significance of the power of judgment in a priori synthesis, the role of which is to grant synthetic unity. My aim is to reconstruct a consistent dialogue between Sellars and Kant by discussing Sellars’s reading of a priori synthesis and comparing his views to Kant’s original aims.
Bredeson, Garrett Zantow: Natorp’s Critique of Appeals to Givenness in Light of the Marburg Renewal of Idealism.
For Natorp, the most urgent task for turn-of-the-century philosophy consisted in recovering the meaning of idealism. Instead of simply appealing to given facts, idealists transform givennesses of all sorts into tasks for thinking under the guidance of laws which we ourselves have laid down and for which we ourselves are responsible. In this paper I will try to connect the dots between (a) the broader Marburg project of tethering philosophy to the achievements of modern science and (b) Natorp’s critique of his contemporaries’ appeals to givenness. Understanding this connection is, in my view, crucial for appreciating the sense and grounding of Natorp’s idealism.
Palette, Virginie: The Resistance of the Given and its Demythologization in Husserl’s Phenomenology.
The objective of this paper is to reconstruct Husserl’s two-pronged approach of sensory givenness. On the one hand, the phenomenological focus on intentional consciousness implies a virulent criticismof the positivistic myth of the sensory given. On the other hand, there is also a positive appeal to sensory givenness in phenomenology, without which phenomenology would not be worthy of its name and would, ultimately, be nothing other than a form of neo-Kantianism. In the context of transcendental genetic phenomenology, Husserl manages to rehabilitate sensory givenness in a reduced, viz. demythologized form. This reconstruction of Husserl’s ambivalent reference to the given can help phenomenology defend itself against some actual trends, which tend to reduce it to phenomenalismor to conceptualism.
Manca, Danilo: Spontaneity and Givenness. Natorp, Husserl, and Sellars’s Neo-Kantianism.
In this article, I propose a comparison between Natorp, Husserl, and Sellars that has a twofold aim. First, I ask to what extent Sellars’s perspective can be considered to be Neo-Kantian. Second, I demonstrate that the point of divergence among these three thinkers does not have to do with the role they ascribe to givenness in knowledge, but with the way they conceive the activity of thinking. Focusing on Husserl’s reading of Natorp’s theses concerning the subjective and objective ground of knowledge, I show that both Natorp and Husserl agree with Sellars on the limits of a positivistic and empiricist perspective that relies on what is given in perception for the justification of one’s epistemic beliefs. On the other hand, the differences between the three thinkers emerge as soon as we consider how they attempt to integrate the spontaneity of thinking into the sphere of intuition from a renewed Kantian perspective.
De Santis, Daniele: Thought, Being, and the Given in Hans Vaihinger’s Die Philosophie des Als Ob.
The goal of the present paper is to assess Hans Vaihinger’s understanding of the notion of the given in Die Philosophie des Als Ob. The claim will be advanced that the overall framework of Vaihinger’s theory of knowledge and, more specifically, his understanding of both the given and fictions should be sought for in the manner in which R. Hermann Lotze assesses the problem of knowledge, namely, the relation between thought and being in both his early and late Logik. As we will argue, the way in which Vaihinger recasts the opposition between what is given objectively (data of sensations) and what is added subjectively is to be deemed a direct radicalization of Lotze’s own stance. As the conclusion will further add, what is at stake in Vaihinger’s fictionalism is a quite specific understanding of the ideas of reason and transcendental philosophy.
Beyer, Christian: Husserls Verhältnis zu Lotze im Lichte seines Göttinger Seminars über „Lotzes Erkenntnistheorie“.
The present contribution elucidates Husserl’s relationship to Lotze in the light of Winthrop Bell’s notes on Husserl’s 1912 seminar on Lotze’s theory of knowledge. Once again, these notes make it clear that Husserl highly appreciated the chapter on Plato’s theory of ideas from Lotze’s 1874 Logic and his anti-psychologistic view of logic, as far as it goes. However, it also becomes clear that Husserl rejected both Lotze’s account of the origins of objectivity in terms of the doctrine of “achievements of thinking (Denkleistungen)” and the discussion of skepticism in the 1874 Logic against the background of his own (Bolzano-inspired) conception of intentionality and his treatment of the epistemological “problem of transcendence” in the framework of the “phenomenological reduction”.
Hefferman, George: Existential Evidence. The Role of Self-Giving in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Existence.
In this paper, I examine, in five parts, the nature and function of evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology of existence. By “evidence” I understand the intentional achievement of self-giving in Husserl’s sense, and by “phenomenology of existence” I understand the branch of his philosophy that addresses the question concerning a meaningful life. In Part One, I propose that Husserl’s philosophy includes a phenomenology of existence. In Part Two, I employ a selection of texts from Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie to sketch the basic outlines of his phenomenology of existence. In Part Three, I demonstrate that Husserl develops a concept of evidence rich enough to encompass the evidence appropriate to his phenomenology of existence. In Part Four, I investigate the way in which Husserl appeals to what one may describe as “existential evidence” to ground his manner of apprehending the world as he sees it. In Part Five, I expand the horizon of the investigation by situating “existential evidence” – the “given” that keeps on giving – in the context of other kinds of evidence more familiar to scholars and students of Husserl’s phenomenology.
Doyon, Maxime: La Gestalt d’autrui. Note sur l’étendue de l’influence de la Gestaltpsychologie chez Merleau-Ponty.
The recognition of a meaningful sensory foundation of perception is central to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. If some commentators do not hesitate to see in the notion of perceptual Gestalt a notion applicable to all domains of being, it is not a priori easy to see how it must be conceived in the more specific context of the perception of others (autrui). However, Merleau-Ponty is very clear on this point: all perception manifests itself in the form of a Gestalt, including the perception of other people. The ambition of this short study is to spell out in rough strokes how this injunction should be heard and thus to explain how others manifest themselves as Gestalts to perceptual consciousness.